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Abstract 
The paper analyses the effects of trade and exchange rate policies on Cameroon's 
agriculture. Theoretical models and formulas are developed for empirical analysis. The 
calculated relative prices and indexes estimates of the degree of over-valuation of the 
real exchange rate and regression analysis including elasticity estimates show that these 
policies have been the major cause of the deterioration of Cameroon's agricultural 
competitiveness. The paper demonstrates the link between real exchange rates and 
agricultural performance. Besides poor price incentives due to government's intervention 
— and failure to intervene when appropriate — the lack of non-price incentives is found 
to hinder the development of the agricultural sector. 
The paper concludes by recommending the removal of these constraints, and 
intervention through devaluation and the maintenance of a realistic exchange rate, export 
lax elimination, reduction of import taxes and increase in public expenditure in the 
agricultural sector. It also suggests alternative ways of raising government revenue. 
I. Introduction 
Since 1986, Cameroon has been declining into a deep economic crisis. GDP fell by 2% 
in 1986/1987 and by 8.5% in 1987/1988. The agricultural sector the main support of the 
economy— has also declined. The causes have been both external and internal. The 
external causes are mainly the fall in petroleum and major agricultural commodity prices 
on the world market. On average, the petroleum price per barrel dropped by 2% and 
cocoa and coffee prices dropped by 17% and 35%, respectively. By 1987, prices of all 
agricultural exports had declined substantially. The fixed parity of the CFA franc with 
the French franc partly contributed to the over-valuation of the Cameroon's currency. 
And with the fall of the US dollar, in which Cameroon's exports are dominated, 
Cameroon's economic situation worsened as the external balance came under increasing 
pressure. 
All this has been coupled with internal structural problems that were (and are 
still) aggravated by public mismanagement. This is partly reflected in the high current 
account deficit, high external debt coupled with accumulation of domestic civil servants' 
salary arrears and the critical financial situation of the parastatals. Cameroon's economy 
seems to be characterized by a high cost structure; the general level of domestic prices 
seems to be higher than world prices. In terms of foreign exchange, imported financial 
products tend to be much lower in cost than domestic products as a result of high labour 
costs, low productivity and inefficient production methods. Also, Cameroon labour 
productivity is much lower than that of other developing countries of Latin America and 
Asia. Exports are mainly limited to primary commodities and lightly transformed products 
that depend mainly on the protected domestic market. Even the domestic market has 
now been invaded by cheap goods from neighbouring countries, particularly Nigeria. 
So Cameroon's exports have become less competitive in the world markets. This type of 
pressure has caused a drastic decline in exports as well as agricultural production, while 
imports have been encouraged. 
The importance of agriculture, in terms of employment, gross domestic products 
(GDP), food, tradeable component and foreign exchange earnings, implies that such 
macroeconomic policies as commodity exports and import taxes, producer prices and 
general price level have tremendous impact on the agricultural sector and also on the 
economy as a whole. Some of these effects are direct, such as specific crop export taxes; 
some are indirect, such as the effects of the over-valuation of domestic currency vis-a-
vis other currencies. 
The main objective of this study is therefore to identify and quantify the effects 
of exchange rate and trade policy on the structure of exports and agricultural exports 
incentives, agriculture output and the anti-export bias against agriculture. 
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In section II we trace the background of the monetary cooperation agreement 
with France and discuss how the over-valuation of the CFA francs has become a concern 
as a result of the difficulties of maintaining a realistic exchange rate. Section III looks at 
the different studies that have been done in this area and demonstrates that little or nothing 
has been done on Cameroon. In section IV we examine the structure and changes in the 
agricultural sector and discuss agricultural constraints. Theoretical models and formulas 
are derived in section V and empirical results are analysed in section VI. The paper 
concludes in Section VII with policy implications. 
II. Background 
The Communaute Financiere Africaine (CFA) countries belong to a monetary cooperation 
agreement with France. In this arrangement the CFA franc is pegged to the French franc. 
The whole zone pools its foreign exchange reserves together, with an operational account 
with the French treasury that guarantees the convertibility of the CFA franc. They have 
a common exchange control system. In the Banque des Etats de 1 Afrique Centrale 
(BEAC) zone, Cameroon's economy accounts for about half the aggregate GDP of the 
total currency area. 
Up to the early 1980s the monetary arrangement of the franc zone seemed to 
have enforced some monetary stability much openness and convertibility, which were 
supposed to have led to more direct investments and a strong regional currency. In the 
1970s the situation caused no alarm partly because capital inflow covered the 
disequilibrium in balance of payments. 
That is , the value of these currencies, as reflected in the exchange rates in the 
CFA countries, was not a concern. However, recently the problem of these currencies 
being over-valued has been brought into focus. The debt crisis has deepened, capital 
inflow has decreased to negligible amounts, exports have declined sharply and foreign 
exchange shortages have become common. World commodity prices declined very 
sharply in 1987 as compared to the situation in 1985. Cameroon's situation has worsened 
as the US dollar has continuously depreciated against other major currencies (including 
the French franc, which did not depreciate as much as the US dollar). Thus, Cameroon's 
exports, especially agricultural exports, further lost their international competitiveness. 
In the 1960s and 1970s the French franc was weak and so the franc zone was more 
competitive, but as the French franc rapidly appreciated relative to the dollar starting in 
the late 1970s, the franc zone became less competitive. In fact, the anglophone economies 
notably Nigeria and Ghana, have improved and have become more competitive. Nigeria 
has become so much more competitive, partly because of CFA over-valuation, that no 
local Cameroon products can compete with its imported equivalent without protection. 
And the franc zone including Cameroon is in both economic and political crisis. The 
institutional and economic structures were exposed by the collapse of commodity prices 
and weakened further by external and internal debt problems. 
The negative impact of the over-valued CFA franc affected the export sector as 
much as the agricultural sector, and consequently the whole economy. Hence, over-
valuation of the CFA franc has now become a great concern. Studies have shown that 
many countries maintain over-valued currrencies and use their marketing boards to depress 
producer prices. These studies on African economies emphasize only the explicit tax 
imposed by the marketing boards and disregard the implicit taxation imposed by the 
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over-valued exchange rate. But both explicit and implicit taxes have the net effect of 
pushing the "domestic prices of commodities much below their border price level". So 
the production of those export commodities is further reduced by the combined effects 
of export taxes and over-valued currency, the high cost of production and the domestic 
price level. 
Exchange rate and macroeconomic policy issues 
Besides protection, export taxes and subsidies, a country can use exchange rate policy to 
change the level of domestic production and industrialization as well as of exports. The 
exchange rate policy is the central tool of trade policy with far-reaching effects, since the 
expansion of exports is effectively linked to export and its relationship with domestic 
prices and costs. In real terms, people produce goods and services if they find these 
activities rewarding. In producing for exports and import-competing goods and services, 
the foreign exchange rate plays a crucial role, as it also relates to domestic prices and 
costs. When the real rate of exchange is such that imports are made more expensive, 
then the production of import-substitution goods and services for export is encouraged. 
But domestic production can be discouraged if imports are made cheap, as in the case of 
Cameroon. 
However, despite the importance of an appropriate real exchange rate, it is not 
easy to maintain a favourable real exchange rate since it involves also the macro-level 
management of the economy. For instance, in narrowing the gap between its official and 
parallel exchange rates, Ghana earned out a step-wise devaluation of its official nominal 
exchange rate concurrently with fiscal reforms in order to reduce the deficit. But Sierra 
Leone met with great difficulties in trying to close the gap between the official and 
parallel market exchange rates. Sierra Leone faced a major problem of fiscal imbalance 
(World Bank, 1988, p. 88). In fact a rise in inflation may reflect a major expansion in 
budget deficits. Fiscal reform seem to be a major requirement for the unification of dual 
exchange rates. But this goes further than that, because the institutions — including 
political, financial and administrative - could also be major determinants in exchange 
rate and fiscal policy changes or reform. The effects of the change in the exchange rate 
on the economy may depend on the total policy package. 
As in 1988, the African franc zone's biggest economies (Cameroon and Ivory 
Coast) faced many economic problems resulting in heavy accumulation of the deficits in 
1 the operational account. It is estimated that France spent 20 billion French francs to 
support the CFA franc parity (Van de Walle, 1991, p. 393). In 1993 Cameroon carried 
out two sharp salary cuts in the public sector in attempt to reduce its fiscal imbalance. 
Besides devaluation, it now seems that the question of delinking the CFA franc 
from the French franc can be discussed openly. The discussion is more important now in 
the context of a potential European monetary union, as well as the economic situation of 
the franc zone. However, the monetary relationship may in the long run depend on the 
domestic socio-economic and political situation of the respective CFA franc countries. 
Ill Literature review 
This study is important and useful for major policy implications. Agriculture is the main 
support of Cameroon's economy, but the country's agricultural production and exports 
have been falling. Even oil production is falling, which underscores the importance of 
agriculture in the economy. Different ways must be sought to greately increase the rate 
of growth of agriculture and to make that growth sustainable. This is especially important 
considering agriculture's large share of GDP and the labour force. African agricultural 
policies in general have been characterized by: 
• import tarifffs, import substitution and protection policies against imports 
competing with domestic production; 
• maintenance of over-valued exchange rates and the imposition of import 
restriction schemes; 
• direct suppression of producer prices through taxation and stabilization 
mechanisms (Krueger, 1988, and Krueger et al, 1991). 
Those policies have tended to inhibit agricultural and export growth in economies 
dominated by agriculture. Yet very little work has been done on the impact of over-
valued exchange rates on African agriculture. Specifically, not much has been done in 
the case of Cameroon. 
Since the breakdown of the Breton Woods system of maintenance of exchange 
rate policies, African countries have experienced exogenous changes in their exchange 
rates partly caused by fluctuations in the major currencies of developed countries. This 
has become a major source of external economic shocks, since African countries have 
strong links with developed countries in trade and payments, as well as monetary 
arrangements. The misalignment/realignment of developed country exchange rates, 
frequently alter the value of African countries' currencies vis-a-vis the currencies of 
their trade partners. These exogenous factors affect African countries' foreign trade and 
domestic economies mainly through changes in relative prices and resource flows. 
In fact, currency floating has complicated policy in African countries as much as 
it has presented an opportunity for African countries to carry out a more active exchange 
rate policy. The countries in the franc zone tend to have a passive exchange rate policy, 
despite the general agreement that these currencies are over-valued and that over-valuation 
contributes to the distortion of domestic incentive structures. Usually the exchange rate 
policy becomes an important trade instrument as the economy becomes more trade 
oriented; in such cases, the real exchange rate plays a crucial role. Hence real exchange 
rate over-valuation may tend to explain partly the decline of agricultural exports. The 
exchange rate policy and the relationship between the real exchange rate and price 
incentives are becoming a major focus in the study of African economic and agricultural 
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decline (Fosu, 1992; Tshibaka, 1991; Oyejide, 1986). 
Previous studies have shown that developing countries do maintain over-valued 
currencies, but have emphasized only the direct impact of tax imposed by the marketing 
boards and neglected the indirect taxation imposed by over-valuation. Elbadawi (1991) 
tries to distinguish the direct and indirect effects of these policies on Sudan's agriculture. 
Very little attention (Fosu, 1992) has been placed on the link between real exchange rate 
and agricultural price incentives in African economies, and the agricultural exports 
response to the real exchange rate. 
Studies such as Krueger et al. (1991), Devarajan and de Melo (1978), Devarajan 
et al. (1991) failed to provide estimates of the responsiveness of the real exchange rate to 
agricultural price incentives. In fact, useful policy parameters such as relevant elasticities 
have not been calculated for Cameroon, although attempts have been made in other 
countries (Bautista and Valdes, 1993). In this study we try to provide some of these 
estimates. Most discussions (Devarajan and de Melo, 1987; Devarajan et al\ 1991) on 
the economies belonging to the CFA franc zone have ruled out the possibility of those 
countries changing the current fixed parity that exists between the CFA franc and the 
French franc. Yet this is very likely to happen. 
For example Devarajan and de Melo examined the adjustments of three countries, 
including Cameroon, within the CFA franc zone and concluded that macroeconomic 
adjustments in these countries could be done by influencing the real exchange rate, instead 
of the nominal exchange rate. This is because the adjustment in these countries had 
different results. The monetary arrangement between France and her former colonies 
has been an unchanged fixed parity of 1 French franc to 50 CFA franc since 1948; such 
that nominal changes in the CFA franc are caused by changes or fluctuations of the 
French franc. (In fact the French franc has arbitrarily been devaluated four times, in 
1969, 1981, 1982 and 1983 (Van de Walle, 1991). Now, the devaluation of the CFA 
franc remains only a question of time. 
In studying the effects of the real exchange rate on agricultural incentives, as 
well as determinants, a two-sector model developed by Dornbusch (1974) has been 
expanded to three sectors, exportables, importables and non-tradeables. 
Using this model some authors (Mundlak and Carallo, 1977) have argued that 
real exchange rate over-valuation has contributed little to the poor performance of 
agriculture in developing economies. Yet the dominant role played by agriculture in 
these economies, particularly in all three sectors, makes it necessary for realistic exchange 
rate policies to be adopted, so as to encourage agricultural growth. Because of the large 
share of agriculture in GDP and the labour force, changes in the relative prices of tradeable 
and non-tradeable goods due to trade and exchange rate policies can have great effects 
on agriculture. In our study, we examine the price incentive structure of the crucial 
sector in the economy, particularly the agricultural sector, bringing out the response of 
relative prices of these sectors to changes in the real exchange rate. 
There is growing discussion on the modelling of real exchange rate (RER) and 
export output. The question is whether RER indirectly affects output through relative 
prices or directly affects output. For instance, in his agricultural export response model, 
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.laciier (1991) used both the producer price and real exchange rate as the independent 
variables. By using the RER as a regressor, it is seen as directly affecting agricultural 
exports because it is used as a proxy for incentives. RER alters the relative prices and so 
a fleets export competitiveness. But Fosu (1992) argued that RER of domestic currency 
hardly affects the agricultural exports directly. The influence of RER is through the 
incentive structure. Hence RER cannot be used as an explanatory variable in an 
agricultural export supply response equation; such models are equally flawed when they 
include both RER and producer price as regressors. There is likely dependence of relative 
priee on RER (Fosu, 1992), but this situation depends on the definition of RER. Regarding 
RHR as reflecting the purchasing value of the domestic currency relative to the foreign 
currency, we could model the RER as affecting the given output through the relative 
prices. 
IV. Research problems and objectives 
Up to December 1993, Cameroon's currency (CFA) has been over-valued vis-a-vis the 
major currencies and in particular the US dollar. This seems to have greatly affected the 
country's agricultural production as well as its exports. And given that agriculture is the 
main support of the economy, it has become a major concern to all interested in the 
country's economy in particular and sub-Saharan African economy in general. But there 
exists little or no quantitative knowledge of the different determinants of agricultural 
outputs and the real exchange rate in the CFA franc countries, particularly in the case of 
Cameroon. It is believed that the over-valued currency has negative effects on agriculture, 
consequently on the economies of the CFA franc countries. But there has been no 
quantitative analysis of any kind of the impact of over-valued exchange rates. No detailed 
study on Cameroon's economy has been done to find out, for instance, the extent to 
which over-valuation taxes agricultural exports or discourages both agricultural exports 
and exports as a whole. Nor has any study determined the extent of the CFA franc's 
over-valuation vis-a-vis the currencies of its trade partners and the US dollar. The trend 
of the over-valuation has not been shown or calculated. 
Moreover, a major proportion of exports is goods produced by the farm sector, 
while imports are mostly consumed by the non-farm sector especially the urban elites. 
To that extent, an over-valued currency tends to tax the farm sector and subsidize the 
non-farm sector. The net effect is that resources, especially income, may be shifted from 
the rural to the urban sector; thus the over-valued currency may aggravate rural poverty 
and increase the inequality between rural and urban sectors. Since the rural sector is 
taxed implicitly for the benefits of urban sectors, knowing by how much the gainers gain 
and the losers lose is very important for policy implications. In fact, it is worth noting 
that those who stand to gain most from realistic policy changes are small holders/producers 
and the urban poor who are politically diffuse and weak. Those who stand to lose are 
politically powerful. 
Interest has now grown within African countries on the use of the exchange 
policy to change the relative incentive structure for export promotion from previous 
import substitution strategy or even passive exchange rate policy. It is necessary to 
identify and quantify the crucial parameters in agricultural policy formation. There is 
very little knowledge of how trade price and exchange rate policy changes could affect 
relative prices, output levels, trade flows or resource shifts. The present study is therefore 
very relevant in helping to fill this gap in our knowledge and provide policy relevant 
information. Specifically this study: 
° Estimates the effects of exchange rate and other trade policies on prices of export 
crops and looks at the trade-off between food crops and export crops; 
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• Estimates the real exchange rate and assesses the degree of over-valuation of the 
exchange rate; and 
' Measures the impact of the exchange rate on Cameroon's agricultural export 
competitiveness; 
V. Structure and changes in agriculture 
Cameroon national accounts classify agriculture as the primary sector that includes 
livestock, fishing, forestry and crops. The crop sub-sector is further divided into two 
other sub-sectors -crops produced mainly for export (export crops) and crops produced 
mainly for domestic consumption (food crops). On the whole, the share of agriculture in 
GDP has been declining and was at its lowest during the oil boom (Table 1). Our study 
focuses on the crop sub-sector of the agriculture sector. The crop sub-sector is the largest 
of the agricultural sub-sectors, accounting for a yearly average of 75% of agriculture 
value. Livestock is the second highest contributer to the total value of agriculture, followed 
by forestry and then fishing (Table 2). 
The broad categorization of crops into food and export groups may be misleading 
in the case of certain food crops that are also export crops. The main traditional export 
crops include cocoa, coffee, cotton, palm products, log and wood products and bananas. 
But of late, much palm oil and bananas have been locally consumed, while other food 
crops such as yams, rice, plantains, maize and millet have been exported particularly to 
neighbouring countries. However, what is clear is nearly all the crops contain some traded 
portion. The food crop traded portion may not be known exactly, partly because of much 
unrecorded cross-border trade. 
The different components of the agricultural sector have changed over time, with 
the food sub-sector continuing to provide the major agricultural contribution to GDP. 
Over the period 1983-1988 food crops accounted for about 54% of the value added in 
agriculture, export crops about 12%, livestock and fishing, 16%, and forestry, 9%. (See 
Table 2 and 3) 
Export crops have contributed up to 87% of total exports, though during the oil 
boom the proportion declined to 27%. With the decline in oil production, the share of 
agricultural crop exports seem to be on the increase, reaching 48% in 1988 (Table 4), 
Within the traditional export crops, cocoa and coffee have the greatest share, but their 
shares have been declining steadily (Table 4). 
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Tphio 1- Agricultural share in GDP (percentages) 1962-1991 
Year 
Share 
1960 1961 1962 
42.3 
1963 
41.3 
1964 1965 
33.0 
Year 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Share 3.41 
Year 
Share 
1972 
34.43 
1973 
34.33 
1974 
33.07 
1975 
33.4 
1976 
33.42 
1977 
2.51 
Year 
Share 
1978 
31.6 
1979 
32.0 
1980 
28.7 
1981 
28.0 
1982 
27.2 
1983 
23.2 
Year 
Share 
1984 
22.5 
1985 
21.0 
1986 
22.2 
1987 
25.6 
1988 
30.5 
1989 
29.0 
Year 
Share 
1990 
29.0 
1991 
33.4 
1992 1993 
Sources: 
(1) World Bank, Cameroon Country Economic Memorandum, Washington, D.C, 1984. 
(2) World Bank, Cameroon Country Economic Memorandum, Washington, D.C,, 1987. 
(3) PNUD, BANQUE MONDIALE, Donnees Economiques et Financieres sur L'Afrique, 
Washington, D.C. 1990 and calculations based on central statistics data 
Table 2: Contribution of agriculture to GDP at constant 1975 prices (in billion CFAF) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Food crops 66.5 68.7 73.6 76.9 80.0 84.6 93.6 94.3 83.9 83.6 84.4 83.8 
Export Crops 50.2 55.6 53.7 55.4 56.3 49.7 51.2 55.5 55.9 60.4 60.4 61.8 
Live-stock 25.2 26.5 27.9 29.5 30.5 31.7 33.8 29.1 29.0 28.9 30.4 30.0 
Fishing 4.2 4.9 5.2 4.8 4.1 4.01 4.9 3.9 3.4 2.8 3.4 3.7 
Forestry 10.7 12.4 14.3 16.8 14.3 16.8 15.6 17.4 29.3 29.0 29.9 30.9 
Total 
Agriculture 156.8 168.1 174.7 183.4 185.2 186.8 199.1 200.2 201.5 204.7 208.5 210.2 
1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1983/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1988/92 
Average Average 
Food crops 244.8 247.2 292.8 320.8 320.8 285.3 444.3 413.0 404.2 384.7 374.7 404.2 
Export crops 139.9 116.7 107.4 98.9 98.9 112.4 202.7 132.7 129.3 115.5 131.0 142.2 
Live-stock 76.7 72.5 81.7 81.5 81.5 78.8 146.6 153.0 149.7 134.6 133.3 143.4 
Fishing 6.2 4.3 5.3 5.7 6.2 5.5 4.4 4.7 4.7 3.1 3.1 4.0 
Forestry 48 53.9 47.6 46.1 48.4 49.0 118.8 139.0 158.5 127.0 124.1 133.4 
Total 
Agriculture 515.6 494.6 534.8 553.0 555.8 531.0 916.8 842.3 846.5 764.9 766.2 827.2 
Source: Cameroon Country Economic Memorandum, 1987, Table 2; National Accounts Cameroon Agriculture Sector Report, 
World Bank, November 1989; Ministry of Agriculture. 
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Table 3: Percentage of sub-sectors irt agriculture 
13 
Percentage of sub-sector in agriculture 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Food % 42.4 40.9 42.1 41.9 43.2 45.3 
Export% 32.0 33.1 30.7 30.2 30.4 26.6 
Total 74.4 74.0 72.8 72.1 73.6 71.9 
crops 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Food % 47.0 47.3 41.6 40.8 40.5 40.0 
Export% 25.7 27.8 27.7 29.5 30.0 29.5 
Total 72.7 75.1 69.3 70.3 70.5 69.5 
crops% 
1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1983/88 
Food % 44.4 50.0 54.7 58 57.7 53.7 
Export% 27.1 23.6 20.1 17.9 17.8 21.2 
Total 71.5 73.6 74.8 75.9 75.5 74.9 
crops % 
% of sub-sector in agriculture (based on current value) 
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 Average 
1988/92 
Food % 48.5 49.0 47.8 50.3 48.9 48.9 
Export % 22.1 15.8 15.3 17.6 17.1 17.2 
Total 70.6 64.8 63.1 67.9 66.0 66.1 
crops % 
Source: Based on Table 2 above 
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Table 4: Share of agricultural exports in total exports (%) 
Year 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 
Crop 
Cocoa and 30.2 26.6 24.0 29.7 36.8 26.7 26.6 
cocoa pro 
Robusta 24.6 23.4 29.3 25.1 19.3 30.3 32.2 
and 
arabica 
coffee 
Logs and 9.9 12.3 13.9 16.1 11.2 12.6 12.9 
wood pro 
Cotton 7.1 4.3 4.2 3.0 2.7 3.8 3.8 
Others 10.4 12.4 11.0 11.9 13.1 10.5 9.4 
Agric 82.2 79.9 82.4 85.8 83.1 83.9 84.9 
exports 
Source: Cameroon CEM 1980; Note: Annuelle de Statistique 1975-82. 
77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 
Cocoa and 36 31 20 13 9 9 10 10 12 
cocoa products 
Robusta and 28 25 23 14 9 11 11 10 14 
arabica coffee 
Logs and wood 12 11 11 7 5 4 3 3 4 
products 
Cotton 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 
Others 7 6 4 2 3 2 2 2 3 
Agricultural 87 76 62 46 30 28 28 27 36 
exports 
Source: World Bank, Cameroon Agricultural Sector Report, Vol II, Washington, D.C. Nov. 1989. 
central statistics 
86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 
Cocoa and cocoa 16 14 12.5 8.0 8.2 6.5 6.1 
products 
Robusta and arabica 15 12 11.1 7.3 8.3 5.9 4.8 
coffee 
Log and wood 5 5 9.5 8.9 10.3 10.9 11.6 
products 
Cotton 2 2 5.3 5.9 4.0 4.2 3.1 
Others 4 6 3.1 2.5 3.8 6.0 5.8 
Agriculture 
Exports 42 48 41.5 32.6 34.6 33.5 31.4 
Source: Adopted from D.P.; DSCN and Central Statistics. 
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Export and food crops 
The per capita income was highest in 1984/85 (406,000 CFA francs in nominal value), 
but has been falling ever since. In 1990/91 it was as low as 249,000 CFA francs (Table 
6). Although a large share of domestic food consumption is provided from domestic 
food production, there is a decline in staple food supply (Table 7). The situation is 
worsening if seen in the light of per capita food production. Consequently, the overall 
living standards of Cameroonians may be falling. The food situation becomes an important 
issue in policy discussion. 
From the colonial period to the present, food production has received very little 
attention. It has been left to small scale producers. The government neglect of the food 
sub-sector shows in the lack of public resources allocated to it. The bias has continued 
also because the principal producers of food are small holders who have no voice in 
public policy decision making, though some small-scale producers also raise export crops. 
The government derives much benefit from the export sub-sector, so directs resources to 
it at the expense of the food sub-sector. With the depressed world market prices for 
agricultural export crops, small-scale producers are shifting their resources into non-
agricultural activities and export crop production. Hence food crops may tend to compete 
with export crop production. 
Table 5: Share of agricultural crops In agricultural exports (%) 
Year 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 
crop 
Cocoa and 
cocoa products 
Robusta and 
arabica coffee 
Logs and 
wood products 
Cotton 
Others 
36.7 33.7 29.1 34.6 
29.9 29.5 35.6 29.3 
8.6 5.4 5.1 3.5 
12.7 15.6 13.3 13.8 
12.0 15.6 16.9 18.8 
44.3 31.8 31.3 
23.2 36.1 37.9 
13.5 15.1 15.2 
3.2 4.5 4.5 
15.8 12.5 11.1 
Agricultural 
exports 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 5: Continued 
1977/78 1978/78 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 
Cocoa and 
cocoa products 42 40 32 32 30 
Robusta and 
arabica coffee 33 33 37 36 31 
Logs and wood 
products 14 15 18 17 17 
Cotton 3 4 6 9 12 
Others 8 8 7 6 10 
Agricultural 
export 100 100 100 100 100 
82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 
Cocoa and 31 37 37 34 38 30 
cocoa products 
Robusta and 39 39 38 40 36 25 
arabica coffee 
Logs and wood 14 9 12 12 11 11 
products 
Cotton 10 8 4 5 5 4 
Others 7 7 8 8 11 13 
Agricultural 100 100 100 100 100 100 
export 
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 
Cocao and 30.1 25.3 23.8 19.5 19.5 
cocoa products 
Robusta and 26.8 22.5 24.1 17.5 15.2 
arabica coffee 
Log and wood 23.0 27.3 29.7 32.5 37.0 
products 
Cotton 12.7 17.1 11.5 12.6 9.9 
Others 7.4 7.8 10.9 17.9 18.4 
Agricultural 
exports 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: World Bank, Cameroon Agricultural Sector Report, Vol. II, Washington D.C., Nov 19889, 
Ministry of Agricultural and Central Statistics 
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Table 6: Per capita income (current CFA francs) for period 1970/71 to 1990/91. 
Year 
Per capita 
income 
1970/71 
47749 
1971/72 
51602 
1972/73 
56671 
1973/74 
68020 
1974/75 
78184 
1975/76 
86441 
Year 
Per capita 
income 
1976/77 
103080 
1977/78 
121179 
1978/79 
139947 
1979/80 
168005 
1980/81 
208793 
1981/82 
246126 
Year 
Per capita 
income 
1982/83 
229414 
1983/84 
337396 
1984/85 
405993 
1985/86 
382918 
1986/87 
340194 
1987/88 
304316 
Year 
Per capita 
income 
1988/89 
291333 
1989/90 
263798 
1990/91 
248534 
Source: Annuaire Statistique du Cameroon, 1983 Comptes Nationaux du Cameroon Rapport 
(CEREE), Ministry of Planning and Regional Development, 1992. 
Table 7: Food Crops Production (In metric tons) in traditional sector (% changes from previous 
years) 
Year 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/761976/77 1977/78 
Crops 
Cassava 97.5 113.4 110.6 172.4 125.5 122.4 
Plaintains 110.1 105.8 120.4 283.0 102.2 104.7 
Taro and 105.8 97.9 136.1 290.4 105.7 107.0 
cocoyams 
Bananas 101.9 100.5 100.6 107.8 99.6 107.3 
Yams 125.8 105.6 102.2 221.3 102.6 104.6 
Potatoes 124.1 104.4 97.8 276.1 83.7 112.4 
Maize 99.8 107.9 122.0 175.6 70.4 102.5 
Millet and 94.6 96.3 118.4 112.2 95.0 83.6 
Sorghum 
Rice less semry 63.9 134.2 202.9 124.2 160.7 89.1 
Groundnuts 108.5 105.0 94.8 104.1 116.9 93.1 
Beans 106.9 111.8 108.4 244.2 82.2 101.7 
Pears 
Sugarcane 95.2 111.9 130.5 211.3 104.6 102.8 
Palm oil 95.5 84.8 107.7 94.0 90.2 101.4 
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Table 7: Continued 
Year 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/ 84 1984/85 
Crop 
Cassava 41.8 101.7 97.2 102.1 81.3 267.1 220.4 
Plaintains 72.6 102.2 99.2 102.9 73.2 54.8 -
Taro and 42.0 97.2 97.2 97.9 105.6 - -
cocoyams 
Bananas 72.4 99.9 73.1 89.0 103.2 149.9 103.5 
Yams 48.3 101.9 99.0 95.3 88.4 30.8 159.6 
Potatoes 25.1 95.7 102.9 102.1 - 28.9 . 
Maize 84.0 101.7 100.7 103.5 115.5 83.3 99.8 
Millet and 125.3 101.3 106.4 79.7 108.1 54.6 115.5 
Rice less 106.4 32.9 32.9 111.0 188.2 53.0 25.2 
semry 
Groundnuts 43.1 134.6 77.7 103.1 109.0 105.3 -
Beans 12.1 101.8 131.9 115.0 - - -
Pears 
Sugar cane 30.6 984.8 126.3 98.3 138.9 - -
Palm oil 100.0 103.0 102.9 103.1 101.8 - -
Crops 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 
Cassava 109.1 99.8 89.3 88.0 146.9 91.8 
Plaintains 125.5 105.8 72.4 90.0 133.0 76.5 
Taro and 461.2 93.0 89.4 93.6 109.0 28.9 
cocoyams 
Bananas 105.8 99.6 100.5 82.4 97.0 100.1 
Yams 70.8 124.9 84.3 78.1 67.9 221.9 
Potatoes 59.9 107.4 85.9 127.9 116.7 124.0 
Maize 82.6 125.7 99.4 94.8 101.8 137.5 
Millet and 166.6 160.0 43.6 177.0 82.1 90.3 
Rice (less 31.1 75.0 70.1 57.5 96.5 225.1 
semry) 
Groundnuts 103.2 97.5 85.6 94.7 93.7 152.1 
Beans 108.1 108.9 65.0 146.8 91.5 116.7 
Pears 70.4 140.9 61.0 155.4 85.1 367.5 
Sugar cane 79.3 146.1 75.0 82.8 76.4 151.0 
Palm oil 70.8 82.0 101.9 85.4 101.2 106.9 
Source: Calculated from 1984 agricultural census of traditional agricultural sector, and 1985-
1991 annual surveys of the traditional agricultural sector, Ministry of Agriculture, Direction des 
Equete Agro-economique etde la Planification Agricole (DEAPA) 
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Table 8:1988/89 system and 1989/90 initial reforms (CFA francs per metric ton) 
Cocoa 1988/89 1989/90 
Freight (forfeiture) 24,779 24,779 
Insurance + "feinte" 13,600 13,216 
Total 38,379 37,995 
FOB 
Transit expense 3,833 3,283 
Charge bill of lading stamp 167 167 
Port tax far 1,267 1,395 
Scaling tax 75 75 
Toll 79 79 
Customs solicitor's fees 450 450 
Shipment tax 1,223 1,223 
Exportation duties 56,000 * 
Specific tax 1,000 1,000 
Drying tax 875 875 
Phytosamitary tax 50 50 
National council tax 900 900 
Subtotal 65,919 9,497 
Producer in Douala 
Packing warehouse rent 783 783 
F. Find/fd rolling 6,258 3,875 
F. Find/security 5,676 4,405 
(Weight loss) 9,117 1,770 
Expense for gathering 3,200 6,160 
Cooperative numeration 4,500 X 
"Cashing" 1,700 X 
Manipulating 1,400 1,400 
Transport differential 11,318 11,318 
Insurance against theft 700 700 
General charges 11,000 9,732 
Exporters benefit 3,000 1,000 
Subtotal 58,652 41,143 
Grand total 162,950 88,635 
Source: SOFRECO, 1991 
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Table 9: Resource flow between cocoa sub-sector and the state 1979 (in billions of CFA francs). 
Export taxes 42.5 Current expenditure 4,3 
Withdrawal by NPMB 30.0 investment budget 5.7 
NPMBAgri. budget 15.0 
Total 72.5 25.0 
Net contribution of main export crop 72.5-25 = 47.5 billion CFA 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 1980, Bilan Diagnostic, p. 62 
Table 10: Reserves of Caisse de stabilisation des prix au Producteurs (CSPP) in billion francs 
CFA. 
Year 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 
Amount of 
reserves 
55.1 849 35.3 85.3 2.5 
Year 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
Amount of 
reserves 
7.8 35.1 63.4 83.9 85.3 70.2 65.7 
Source: SOFRECO report, 1990. Export taxes not included. 
Export crop pricing 
Government intervention in pricing and marketing of agricultural export crops has been 
relatively high in Cameroon. The government has set the producer price of the major 
export crops, regulated the marketing of these crops and set the distribution, tax and 
profit margins. Producer prices for cocoa, coffee and cotton are set yearly. The price 
shedule, called "bareme" (Table 8), sets the remuneration margins for each step of the 
marketing process. Producer prices have been set at low levels and falling world prices 
have not allowed increases in producer prices. The stabilization funds (estimated at 114 
billion francs in 1985/86) could have covered the subsidy in principle. In practice, 
however, this amount did not and does not exist for the farm sector because it was diverted 
to other uses. So while export crops have provided huge resources to the government, 
the pricing system has not provided incentives to producers to increase production. 
Up till 1991 when the structural adjustment program (SAP) reduced the export 
taxes, resources were heavily extracted from the export crop sub-sector. Export taxes 
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and withdrawals have been substantial. For the period 1970-1985, the withdrawals were 
on average 48% for cocoa and 46% for coffee, with very little plowed back into the sub-
sector. Tables 9 and 10 show how much reserves or withdrawals the state took from the 
cocoa and coffee trade, excluding export taxes. 
Food crops 
Untill recently the government has in principle regulated the marketing, transportation 
and prices of food-stuffs in Yaounde and Douala. This has not been effective. But price 
regulation has been applied effectively on a few crops - rice, flour, edible oils, sugar and 
bread. The prices have been fixed to cover the production costs, though most of these 
price-controlled products are produced by parastatals at very high costs. Tariffs have 
also been imposed to protect the domestic production of these so-called important 
products. 
To a greater extent domestic rice production has not been competitive mainly 
because of very high official consumer prices and high transport costs from the producing 
zone (in the north) to the main consuming centres in the south of the country. 
Agricultural constraints 
The performance of Cameroonian agriculture has been greately affected by many 
elements, including primary resources and institutional and infrastructural factors. The 
main resources used in agricultural production are land, labour, capital and water in the 
most general terms. 
The land quality based on agroclimatic conditions is favourable for production 
of a great variety of crops. On the other hand, Cameroonian agriculture is a rainfed 
system, so that crop production is subject to the vagaries of climatic conditions. Moreover, 
the agricultural labour force is aging. The situation is worsened by migration of young 
people to non-agricultural areas -particularly to the cities. Labour shortages both in 
quantity and quality are a serious long-term problem, especially as Cameroon's agriculture 
is labour intensive. 
Rudimentary impliments such as hoe and cutlass are predominantly used on 
farms. Bureaucratic obstacles are reflected in red-tape, long delays in decision making 
and interventionist and paternalistic policies that may leave farmers with no private 
initiative. The government has not provided the necessary public investment to give the 
right environment for increased agricultural activities. Some of the major other factors 
beside pricing that are highly condusive to agricultural production, but lacking in 
Cameroon, are infrastructure, inputs, information and institutional frameworks. These 
are discussed below. 
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Infrastructure 
Infrastructure that links production locations with other parts of the country, particularly 
consumption areas is important. Storage and transportation facilities including roads are 
essential for ensuring the movement of persons, goods and services from one place to 
another. 
The lack of these structures leads to fragmented markets, since market signals 
are not effectively transmitted and responsiveness to price incentives is inhibited. All 
this limits the price mechanism from operating effectively. For example, in China 
agriculture improved significantly in the 1970s mainly because in the 1960s the Chineses 
government built an appropriate agricultural infrastructure (RAJ, 1991). Cameroon now 
suffers from deteriorating roads and lack of rural infrastructure. The total classified road 
network (paved and earth), which was 32,714 kilometers in 1982, has not increased 
(Amin, 1991). Since then, even the paved roads are deteriorating because of lack of 
maintenance. 
In fact, the kilometers of classified road per head have declined. In 1981/82 the 
ratio was .0037 but in 1989/90 the ratio decreased to .003 (Amin, 1991). The limited 
road and railway infrastructure presents a great constraint to the agricultural sector in 
terms of the movement of goods and people. This makes it difficult for farmers to respond 
to production incentives. 
Inputs 
The timely availability of inputs such as fertilizers, equipment and water permits the 
proper and efficient production of crops. 
The agency in Cameroon which carried on research on farm equipment has been 
closed, and not much is now being done to improve the rudimentary equipment used by 
farmers. Less than 2% of Cameroon farmers owned/used machinery such as tractors, 
ploughs and sprayers, though the use of machinery is more common in the northern 
provinces. The small size of farms in the southern provinces to some extent limit the use 
of machinery. It may be that organizations like cooperatives can find ways to introduce 
and encourage the use of small farm equipment. While the majority of the farms in 
western province use much fertilizers, the other regions hardly use them at all. 
Information networks 
The existence of information networks, such as research and extension services, to ensure 
the availability of necessary and appropriate technology is much lacking. There is very 
little applicability of research findings, and the link between the reseach institutions and 
small-scale farmers is weak. This leads to stagnant technology. 
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Efficient institutional frameworks 
A framework for providing marketing and credit services for proper performance of the 
commodity marketing system is non existent. With the collapse of commercial banking 
sector, which was not even geared towards encouraging the agricultural sector, the rural 
sector now depends mainly on the informal financial market. 
Moreover, adequate nourishment and health and education facilities are essential 
for increasing labour productivity and hence food production. Human capital investment 
enhances productivity. It has been shown that persons who acquire primary education 
significantly increase their productivity. The economic crisis is having far-reaching effects 
on the rural population, with the result that human capital formation is being compromised. 
This is even reflected in the UNDP studies on Cameroon human development (PNUD, 
1991, 1993). 
Overcoming constraint 
These constraints inhibit agricultural production as well as the transmission of price 
signals to the producer. In fact, the non-price factors such as technological backwardness, 
limited or no access to required inputs, poor marketing facilities and inadequate transport 
are a major constraint to agricultural production. 
Hence investment in research and technological change should simultaneously 
be done with the building of rural infrastructure, since social overhead capital (like roads, 
health, educatiion, etc) is very low in Cameroon's rural regions. The shortages of these 
public goods point out the crucial importance of government's policies towards the 
agricultural sector. Taxing agriculture or stabilizing producer prices must be fully judged 
with government's investment expenditures in agriculture, which can also offset the 
revenue extracted from Cameroon agriculture. Physical capacity development, 
institutional development and human capacity development are all interrelated as well, 
as they involve great social investments in roads, infrastructure, education and health 
facilities. 
VI. Theoretical models and formulas 
The real exchange rate (RER) is critical in determining the profitability of both exportable 
and import-competing agriculture, since "RER measures the real terms of trade between 
traded and nontraded goods" (Oyegide, 1986, p. 42). If we assume the sensitivity of 
intra - and inter-sectoral resource flows to changes in relative prices, then changes in 
RER resulting from relative price changes would affect intersectorial profitability. This 
shifts resources between various sectors in the economy. 
So an increase in RER would shift resources from non-tradeables to tradeables. 
and a decline in the RER would move resources from tradeables to non-tradeables. 
Changes in RER (terms of trade) are influenced also by export taxes, import tariffs and 
price policies, 
In studying the trade, (real) exchange rate and price policies within the three-
sector framework, it is usually assumed that excess supply and excess demand for 
tradeables and excess demand for non-tradeables are mainly a function of relative prices. 
This is because of the belief in the power of production incentives for shifting resources 
within and among economic activities. Hence the motivation for our measuring different 
relative prices and price intervention. For instance, an imposition of import taxes increase 
the domestic price of importable relative to exportables and non-tradeables. Producers 
therefore find it more profitable to produce importables while consumers switch to 
consumption of exportables and non-tradeables. But at the same time resources are 
induced to move into the local production of importables. This means a shortage in 
resources for the production of exportables and non-tradeables and increases in their 
prices. The process creates a final equilibrium where the price of the importables is less 
than the imposed tax since there has also been an increase in the price of non-tradeables 
and domestic price of exportables. 
On the other hand, if export tax is imposed on export goods, this reduces the 
domestic price of the exportables relative to non-tradeables and importables. This results 
in an increase in domestic demand for exportables, but also leads to decreased production 
of exportables as resources shift to importables and non-tradeables. The process expands 
production in non-tradeables and importables and contracts exportables. There is then 
downward pressure on the price of non-tradeables and importables until a new demand 
and supply equilibrium is reached. The price of non-tradeables and importables decreases 
but not to the §ame extent as the imposed export tax. It should be noted that these three 
main sub-sectors can be divided further. But it is also very important to note that the 
lowering of the real exchange rate or over-valuation of the domestic curreny cannot be 
easily corrected by adjusting the nominal exchange rate alone. Instead, the correction 
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caii be done by eliminating trade restrictions (Bautista, 1987, p. 50) and by looking at the 
fundamental problem. 
Data sources 
Data on the relevant variables such as export taxes, nominal exchange rate, output prices, 
trade flows, tariff rates, government budget, main economic indicators, etc, were collected 
from a variety of sources. These included government statistical departments, various 
issues of IMF International Financial Statistics, FAO Trade Yearbook and National 
Produce Marketing Board documents. Other sources were relevant published and 
unpublished materials, reports and studies on the agricultural sector. 
These were supplemented with other qualitative information based on interviews, 
qucstionaires and discussions. This study involved a large data requirement, especially 
for estimating the basic indexes and the determinants of RER. Our major source of data 
was the Cameroon Central Statistical Department. 
We faced many problems in collecting the data series; some of the problems 
were due to change of methodology used for putting the data together. Some series are 
not complete, while some are not even available. In certain cases, for completeness we 
had to piece data from different sources into a single series or construct missing data 
points from other aggregates. In most cases the same data set or series (variables) from 
different sources were not consistent. Above all, the quality of much of the data was 
poor. Hence we have to interpret the result with care. 
Direct and indirect agricultural taxation 
Besides the extensive literature on the direct effect of exchange rate policy on agriculture, 
there is a growing discussion of the indirect effect. The direct effect, by government 
intervention, is mainly through pricing policies. 
In this section we derive formulas to assess the impacts of these policies on 
Cameroon's agricultural prices and products. These measures are partly based on those 
developed by Krueger (1988), Krueger et al (1991) and Elbadawi (1992). These permit 
an evaluation of how foreign price changes and trade policy affect agricultural price 
incentives. 
Let P. be the producer price of agricultural tradeable good / and P be its border 
price, while the official nominal exchange rate is E. E is the amount of CFA francs per 
unit of foreign currency 
The producer price can be affected directly by a variety of government policies, 
such as export taxes, stabilization fund, price fixing and marketing arrangements, as 
seen above. The extent of the total intervention can be measured in at least two ways: 
a) Nominal protection coefficient (NPC), which is the ratio of producer price (P.) to 
the border price (P) with adjustment made for transport, storage, and other costs. It 
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compares the price the producer receives to what the producer might have received in 
the absence of government intervention. It is written as: 
NPCj = Pf/Pfi (1) 
b) Nominal protection rate (NPR), which is similar to NPC but measures the 
percentage difference between the border price (P ) and the producer price. It is wrtten 
as: 
P -P 
NPR = -L—JL (2) 
r f > 
This could be redefined to take into consideration the transport-adjusted border price at 
the official exchange rate; the direct nominal protection rate is: 
NPR = IJI^zIAILsl (3) 
P f l / P m { ) 
Where PNA is the non-agricultural sector price index and the starred variables are 
evaluated at the nominal exchange rate. 
NPRD therefore computes the impact (P. - Pf/PNA) of the direct policies as a 
proportion of PJPNA - the relative price prevailing in the absence of all interventions. 
In calculating NPRD, the official exchange rate is used. Only the direct effects of 
trade policy are measured. 
The indirect nominal protection rate (NPR.) measures the effect of the nominal 
exchange rate (E) deviation from the equilibrium exchange rate (E*) on non-agricultural 
tradeables. That is: 
NPR, = _ i (4) 
P I P 1 f i < 1 NA 
This is a measure reflecting the nominal rates of protection adjusted by sectoral and 
economy-wide policies. It combines both the sectoral effects and economy-wide price 
interactions on agricultural prices. 
Effective exchange rates 
The effective exchange rates for importable (EJ and exportable (EJ goods can be 
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measured using the following formulas: 
Ex = E(l-tJ (5) 
Em = E(UtJ (6) 
where t and t are the export tax rate and import tariff rate, respectively. This 
could also be used for each exportable agricultural good. We could also compute a more 
generalized effect of trade policies on foreign exchange prices by weighting the tariff on 
import and taxes on exports. 
Trade bias index 
We use a trade bias index (TBI) to compute the aggregate incentives reflected in the trade 
regime. TBI indicates the degree to which the trade regime promotes or discourages the 
production of export goods vis-a-vis imports. We express TBI as EJEm. 
TBI = E IE = (1 -1) I (1 + t ) = 1 (7) A- m ; A >n' 
Trade is encouraged when this measure is greatest than one and so exports are promoted 
against import substitution and vice versa. 
Within the tradeable goods category there may be some goods that are more 
favoured than others. We use effective exchange rate for each group to identify the more 
favoured group: 
Ej/Eh if EjlEj>l (8) 
then j is being promoted relative to /'. Product-specific price effects of trade policy are 
used within a group of commodities. Using the domestic price relative to border price of 
/ and k yields: 
(PJPt) / (PfJPfk) (9) 
e.g; cocoa (i) and coffee (k) 
Tradeables 
We define the domestic prices of exportables (Px) - what the producer receives of 
importables (PJ - what the consumer pays; and of tradeables (PT), as follows: 
Px = E(1 - tX) P* (10) 
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Pm = E(1 + tJF\n (11) 
P — Pa^ pl-ab 
T x m V1 
where 0 <ab>l 
Note that P\ and P'm are world prices and exports and imports, respectively. Inserting 
equations 10 and 11 into equation 12, and taking natural logs on both sides, we have 
In PT = In E+ab In (I -tj+ab In P* + (l-ab)In (1 +tj+ (l-ab)In P*m (13) 
Hence PT depends on exchange rates, trade policy and foreign prices. 
Non-tradeables 
In a competitive market situation the price and quantity sold are determined by market 
forces; with the law of one price holding at equilibrium, the quantity supplied would 
equal the quantity demanded. We can therefore simply derive the price of the non-
tradeable sector (PN) from the expenditure identity based on national accounts data 
(Devarajan et al; 1991, p. 13). We can calculate the price level of non-tradeables from 
the expenditure identity: total value of gross domestic products is equal to the total value 
of non-tradeables plus total value of exports. 
GDP. Deflator = P.,,N + Px 
Hence, ~ , , , (14) 
(gdp-x) K J 
Many other indexes have been suggested as proxy for the non-traded goods 
price. Indexes such as a national consumer price index are not available in Cameroon. 
Instead, consumer price indexes are available for Yaounde and Douala; these can be 
used to calculate the real exchange rate, but there are problems of inclusion. 
We have also used other indexes as proxies for the price of non-tradeables. These 
indexes are a construction index and an index for electricity, gas and water. We regard 
these as non-tradeables in that prices are mainly determined by domestic demand and 
supply. However, there are usual problems of poor coverage and measurement in 
constructing these indexes. 
GDP .Deflator - P xX 
Real exchange rates 
There are various definations of real exchange rate (RER), which may give rise to different 
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implications and problems. The government through the monetary authorities determines 
the nominal exchange rate, which may give room for potential distortion as reflected in 
over-valuation. Cameroon belongs to the franc zone and therefore pegs its currency to 
the French franc at a fixed nominal rate. This does not, however, guarantee the stability 
of the nominal exchange rate against other currencies. 
In neoclassical trade theory, the real exchange rate is regarded as the ratio of the 
price of tradeable (PT) to that of non-tradeable goods (PN). This measure does on the 
whole help in analysing the resource flow and determining the cost of producing tradeable 
goods relative to non-tradeable goods. It takes into consideration importables, exportables 
and home goods. Thus the definition reflects the incentive structure that encourages the 
allocation of resources across these sectors. P J P N not only summarizes how resources 
are allocated domestically in these sectors, it also gives an index to judge the extent to 
which a country's tradeable sector is internationally competitive. 
The major limitation of this definition are the problems of obtaining the 
appropriate data and the difficulty of distinguishing between tradeables and non-tradeables. 
For instance, Devarajan and de Melo (1978) calculated RER on the basis of national 
accounts. They regarded agriculture and industry as the tradeable sector and the rest of 
the economy as non-tradeables. This is subject to many problems. One big problem is 
separating the tradeables from the non-tradeables among and within sectors. It is hard to 
say which sector is dominantly tradeables or non-tradeables, as they did. This is different 
from equation 14, which is based on a general equilibrium model with three goods — 
exports, imports and domestic goods. 
Cameroon's exportables are mainly primary goods and some light manufactured 
goods, and imports are mostly intermediates and capital goods with very few domestic 
substitutes. Hence, aggregating those to a tradeable sector may distort our view of 
Cameroon's adjustment process in response to changes in terms of trade. Traditionally, 
the definition of RER has tended to rely on the purchasing power parity (PPP) approach, 
where RER is the product of the nominal exchange rate and some foreign price index 
divided by the domestic price index. There are measuring problems and problems in the 
choice of the variables, and PPP may greatly differ with RER (Tshibaka, 1991). 
Equilibrium RER 
Another problem is being able to pinpoint the equilibrium RER; since discussion on 
competitiveness of export implies that the RER is out of equilibrium or is misaligned. 
Both external and domestic economic environments change, and the structure of the 
economy changes with time. Consequently, the RER would have different equilibrium 
from a given benchmark year. In order to adjust the exchange rate, the policy makers 
need to know the equilibrium exchange rate and by how much it has changed. RER says 
nothing about under-or over-valuation. It only shows that RER fluctuates around a certain 
base level. In effect we are assuming that a certain RER was correct in the past or it was 
at an equilibrium that may not even be known - but if known could become a basis for a 
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target since RER per se is not controlled by the government. Instead, in order to maintain 
a target RER, changes in the nominal exchange rate could be coupled with monetary and 
fiscal policy measures. Within the BEAC zone, Cameroon cannot make any arbitrary 
changes in its nominal exchange rate; it can only carry out internal adjustments such as 
fiscal policy measures or changes in domestic cost structure. 
El • • • BPBfc ••• P^ stimating RER 
In estimating the RER and calculating the extent of the over-valuation we try to use 
different definitions of RER, partly to cross-check each other and to show how they 
differ from each other. The most commonly used one is defined as 
RER = EP.i/Pn (15) 
This is the relative incentive between tradeables and non-tradeables in the domestic 
economy, written as P^Pn and PN should be an index of domestic currency, so that the 
foreign currency prices are calculated in domestic prices using the nominal exchange 
rate (E). Thus, RER = EP.JPN where P,r is the index of foreign prices of tradeable goods. 
Since the trading partners are involved, we can use the multilateral formula below. 
In this case, E, P,r and X are the nominal exchange rate, index of tradeables and weight of 
trading partner /, respectively, and N is number of trade partners. Thus; 
^(XnEnPiT)/N 
RER = (16) 
RER is also used to measure Cameroon's agricultural competitiveness. Other measures 
of a country's competitiveness, such as unit cost of labour, are highly unreliable in 
Cameroon mainly because of the dearth of data. Hence for internal consistency in our 
calculation of PN based on Equation 14, we also use both export price (PJ and import 
price (PJ indexes as the numerator to actually calculate the RER. 
Incentive structure and model derivation 
To determine the effects of the real exchange rate (RER) as a price incentive, we need to 
develop certain price relations. For convenience, we classify the economy into three 
main markets -domestic non-tradeables, exports and imports. This classification could 
be extended into six or more categories (Fosu, 1992), namely, non-agricultural non-
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tradeables (NAN), agricultural non-tradeables (AN), agricultural exports (AX), non-
agricultural exports (NAX), agricultural imports (AM) and non-agricultural imports 
(NAM). (Non-tradeables are wholly produced and consumed domestically. Exportables 
are goods whose domestic production is greater than domestic consumption and 
importeables are goods with domestic production less than domestic consumption). 
We assume that local supply and demand conditions determine the prices of 
non-tradeables, while prices of exportables and importables (tradeables) are directly related 
to their world prices. We have seen, above, the relationship between foreign prices of 
both exportables and importables and domestic prices. 
We examined the price relationships among and within the importables, 
exportables and non-tradeable sectors. The relative prices among these goods indicate 
the relative incentives to producers as well as relative costs to consumers. Thus they 
determine the demand for and supply of these goods and the movement of resources. We 
could therefore use the Cobb-Douglas type functions to represent the aggregate prices. 
That is: 
a. Price of non-tradeables (P ) as aggregate of agricultural non-tradeable price (PAN) 
and non-agricultural non-tradeable (PNAN) 
P NAN^ AN ( Y l ) 
b. Agricultural price (PJ as an aggregate of non-tradeable agricultural price (PAN), 
agricultral export price (PAX) and agricultural import price (PAM). 
p _ p " p « p i-i>-a 
A AX AM1 AN V 1 0 / 
c. Non- agricultral price (PNA) as aggregate price of non-agricutral exports (PNAX), 
price of non-agricultural imports (PNAM) and price of non-agricultural non-tradeables 
(PNAN 
p _ p 1 P hp \-a-b / i m 
r N A ~ rNAXrNAM rNAN > 
d. Price of tradeable goods (PT) as an aggregate of export price (Pj and price of 
imports (PJ. 
pT = pf Pl;a" (20) 
These relationships reflect the composition of the aggregate prices. They could be used 
to estimate the prices and relative prices that depend on the trade and exchange rate 
policies. In short, the relationships are embedded in the incidence model we use in 
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analysing proportional changes in the price of different groups of commodities relative 
to others. The incidence model is specified in natural logarithms to estimate the price 
relationship. Thus: 
ln(PJPx)=ln a + h, ln(PJPx)+h2 In TBR + hJnPc + e (21) 
Where TBR is the balance of trade variable defined as the ratio of trade balance (exports 
- imports) to export and Pc is the productive capacity variable defined as real GDP. TBR 
and Pc are regarded as shifters, while h, indicates the combined effects of commercial 
and exchange rate policies on the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors. This is a highly 
aggregated general equilibrium model of three goods - importables, exportables and 
non-tradeables (with their respective prices) - that is complemented with detailed 
inferences. The estimation is on time series data, so that real income is not constant, and 
neither is there a balanced external account over time. 
Agricultural exports responses to RER 
Although there is an extensive literature on supply response, there are different views on 
the responsiveness of agricultural crop to price. These views range from emphasis on 
individual agricultural commodities to aggregate supply responses and Oyejide (1990) 
has concisely discussed these problems. In this study we also analyse the response of 
two main export crops to changes in relative prices and indirectly to RER. 
Cocoa and coffee are produced mainly for export. The quantity exported is, 
therefore, a good approximation of the amount produced. We would, however, analyse 
the total agricultural exports response to relative prices. Comparing the value of foreign 
currency with that of domestic currency, the domestic currency in terms of its real 
purchasing power is here expressed as real exchange rate. Hence, to estimate the effects 
of RER on agricultural exports, we do so indirectly through price incentives. 
Implicit models are as follows: 
P P 
Xjt = f(Xit - 1 , — — — , trend, weighted income of importer, error term) (22) 
^N PNA 
Xjt = f ( X j t - 1 , — —— trend, weighted income of trading partners, error term)(23) 
where / = cocoa, coffee 
j = agricultural exports, non-agricultural exports and 
X = export crop. 
VII. Empirical results 
The nominal protection coefficient for the length of the period is less than one for the 
three major export crops — cocoa, arabica and robusta coffee. That is, the producer has 
consistently been receiving 50% or less of the FoB price (Table 11 and figure 1). 
An estimation of the nominal protection rate (Table 12) yields similar results. This 
also shows the degree of price distortion or total intervention in two major export crops 
— cocoa and coffee. 
A highly over-valued exchange rate coupled with trade and pricing policies results 
in a strong disincentive for the production of these agricultural export crops. Through-
out the period, the indirect effects on the incentives are much greater than the direct 
effects. In all, the total effects are very large as seen in the cocoa example (Table 13) 
where we attempt to separate the total intervention into direct and indirect effects. The 
direct effects result from trade restrictions and commercial policy; indirect effects result 
mainly from exchange rate misalignment. This high level of agricultural taxation results 
from exchange rate and trade policies that also induced high relative prices of domestic 
goods. 
As seen in Figure 2 and Table 14, the price of agricultural exports relative to 
prices of non-tradeables have declined since the mid 1970s. This indicates that the relative 
price of exports have fallen over time; for the period of the real over-valuation of CFA 
franc, we would expect a decline in the production of tradeable goods. The implication 
is that the prices of non-tradeables have been increasing, consequently resources must 
have been induced into the non-tradeable sector. 
There is a similar situation with the price of agricultural exports (P AX) relative to the 
price of food (P ). As from 1979, the price of food increased relative to the price of 
agricultural exports (Table 15). As the price of domestically produced and consumed 
food increased, more resources shifted into this sub-sector relative to the agricultural 
export sector, since food activities became more rewarding. 
The effective exchange rates for importables (EJ and exporteables (EJ are 
measured on the basis of import tariffs and export tax rates. Our estimates show that Em 
is higher than Ex. consequently the overall trade bias index (EJEJ is less than one for 
each year for the period 1971-1992. From Table 16 we observed that the importables are 
highly protected relative to exportables. But this has indirectly produced negative effects 
on the production of exporteables. Resources are instead diverted to import substitutes 
and non-tradables. This index is highly aggregative and shows the extent to which the 
trade regime has discouraged the production of exportables relative to importables. 
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Table 11: Nominal protection coefficient for cocoa (C0), arabica (Ca) and robusta (Cr) coffee 
exports 
Year NPCco NPCca NPCcr 
1963 0,598 0,882 0,634 
1964 0,800 0,814 0,739 
1965 0,825 0,766 0,819 
1966 0,354 0,783 0,671 
1967 0,359 0,830 0,975 
1968 0,274 0,810 0,719 
1969 0,357 0,771 0,709 
1970 0,590 0,725 0,801 
1971 0,664 0,589 0,635 
1972 0,402 0,665 0,613 
1973 0,396 0,616 0,625 
1974 0,361 0,676 0,646 
1975 0,508 0,725 0,566 
1976 0,429 0,667 0,747 
1977 0,285 0,337 0,619 
1978 0,324 0,352 0,342 
1979 0,393 0,538 0,359 
1980 0,496 0,413 0,529 
1981 0,636 0,505 0,444 
1982 0,650 0,526 0,444 
1983 0,455 0,582 0,609 
1984 0,439 0,410 0,450 
1985 0,437 0,373 0,394 
1986 0,444 0,337 0,345 
1987 0,587 0,645 0,434 
1988 0,654 0,646 0,417 
1989 0,861 0,652 0,704 
1990 0,792 0,591 
1991 0,746 0,312 
1992 0,667 0,415 
1993 0,440 0,425 
/ 
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Figure 1: NPC for Cocoa, arabica, robusta exports 
NPCco/NPCce/NPCcr 
Yoars 
Figure 2: PX, PAx, relative to PAx/P (food) 
P(ax)/P(n), P(x)/P(n), P(ax)/P(food) 
Years 
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Figure 1: NPC for Cocoa, arabica, robusta exports 
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Figure 2: PX, PAx, relative to PAx/P (food) 
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Table 12: Nominal protection rates for cocoa, and coffee (robusta and arabica) 
NPR A r a b i c a N P R R o b u s t a N P R C o c o a 
1971 -0.412 -0.365 -0.336 
1972 -0.335 -0.387 -0.598 
1973 -0.384 -0.375 -0.604 
1974 -0.544 -0.354 -0.559 
1975 -0.275 -0.434 -0.492 
1976 -0.333 -0.253 -0.571 
1977 -0.663 -0.381 -0.715 
1978 -0.648 -0.658 -0.676 
1979 -0.462 -0.641 -0.607 
1980 -0.587 -0.471 -0.504 
1981 -0.495 -0.556 -0.364 
1982 -0.474 -0.556 -0.350 
1983 -0.418 -0.391 -0.545 
1984 -0.590 -0.550 -0.561 
1985 -0.627 -0.606 -0.563 
1986 -0.663 -0.655 -0.556 
1987 -0.355 -0.566 -0.413 
1988 -0.354 -0.583 -0.346 
1989 -0.348 -0.296 -0.139 
1990 -0.409 -0.401 +0.232 
1991 -0.688 -0.630 -0.254 
1992 -0.587 -0.550 -0.333 
Source: Author's estimates 
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Table 13: Direct and Indirect effects for cocoa 
50 
. Year Direct (%) Indirect (%) Total (%) 
1971 -9.3 -24.3 -33.6 
1972 -28.4 -31.4 -59.8 
1973 -21.1 -39.3 -60.4 
1974 -25.4 -30.5 -55.9 
1975 21.1 28.1 -49.2 
1976 -25.8 -32.9 -58.7 
1977 -26.2 -45.3 -71.5 
1978 -24.4 -43.2 •67.6 
1979 -20.3 -40.3 -60.6 
1980 -17.3 -33.1 -50.4 
1981 -14.1 -22.3 -36.4 
1982 -11.7 -23.3 -35.0 
1983 -22.3 -32.2 -54.5 
1984 -17.2 -38.9 -56.1 
1985 -20.2 -36.1 -56.3 
1986 -20.4 -35.2 -55.6 
1987 -10.0 -31.3 -41.3 
1988 -13.9 -21.2 -34.1 
1989 -3.3 -10.6 -13.9 
1990 -6.8 +30.0 +23.2 
1991 -5.1 -20.3 -25.4 
1992 -12.1 -21.2 -33.3 
Source: Author's estimates 
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Table 15: Effective exchange rates and trade indexes 
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Year EX EM TBI 
1971 245.284 361.036 .674 
1972 222.182 330.745 .671 
1973 196.143 289.757 .676 
1974 202.188 308.096 .656 
1975 188.593 285.032 .661 
1976 210.232 315.414 .666 
1977 221.112 330.842 .667 
1978 216.634 327.207 .662 
1979 208.466 268.027 .777 
1980 190.152 270.438 .700 
1981 244.557 339.663 .720 
1982 315.456 400.904 .786 
1983 365.818 457.272 .800 
1984 423.851 524.352 .810 
1985 440.274 539.112 .816 
1986 339.374 398.245 .852 
1987 294.529 360.648 .815 
1988 279.979 306.786 .912 
1989 293.572 328.58 .893 
1990 295.613 404.949 .73 
1991 294.914 403.991 .73 
1992 289.817 408.192 .71 
Source: Author's estimates 
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Table 16: Product-specific price effects 
Cocoa/arabica Cocoa/robusta Arabica/robusta 
1971 0.55 0.68 1.24 
1972 0.55 0.72 1.32 
1973 0.51 0.69 1.35 
1974 0.50 0.74 1.48 
1975 0.51 0.83 1.62 
1976 0.43 0.67 1.56 
1977 0.46 0.60 1.30 
1978 0.61 0.79 1.29 
1979 0.74 0.84 1.13 
1980 0.85 0.91 1.06 
1981 0.88 0.94 1.09 
1982 0.84 0.94 1.12 
1983 0.80 0.94 1.17 
1984 0.82 0.95 1.15 
1985 0.88 0.98 1.10 
1986 0.88 0.95 1.08 
1987 0.88 0.95 1.08 
1988 0.88 0.95 1.08 
1989 0.88 0.95 1.08 
1990 0.88 0.95 1.08 
1991 1.00 1.61 1.61 
1992 0.85 1.33 1.58 
1993 0.60 1.00 1.67 
Source: Author's estimates 
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Table 17: Trend of RER 
Explanatory Dependent RER-I RER2 RER3 RER4 RER5 
Independent Variable 
variable model 1 2 3 4 5 
Trend (T) -16.85 -6.29 -20.54 -3.27 -.53 
(-4.1) (-1.12) (-3.79) (-1.5) (-7.90) 
Constant 591 495 691.1 359.12 56.38 
(11.44) (7.0) (10.12) (13.12) (66.95) 
R2 .67 .26 .53 .21 .87 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
Even examining the effects of pricing policy on the two major export crops — cocoa and 
coffee — the estimates of the price ratios show that generally more encouragement has 
been given to coffee than to cocoa, and within the coffee category arabica coffee is 
promoted much more than robusta. However, these perennial crops are region specific. 
The geographic and climatic or ecological conditions favouring their growth are different 
in their specific regions. It is difficult, for instance, to grow cocoa in the same region 
with arabica coffee. But certain resources, such as labour and finance could be shifted to 
the region if there were greater incentives to do so. 
For the period 1971-1992 the real exchange rate (RER) showed a declining trend, 
as seen in the regression estimates in Tables 8.1. We have five measures of RER that are 
each regressed against time (T). The t-statistics are in parentheses and T is the trend 
term. The decline of the RER means that there has been a real appreciation of the CFA 
franc or over-valuation of the domestic currency and consequently under-valuation of 
the foreign currency — the US dollar. All the different measures of RER move together, 
and RER, RER6 and RER? are similar so that any of the measures could be used. We 
therefore use the EPJPN to calculate the degree of over-valuation 
PT = Simple average price of exports and imports 
P 
NE = Index for electricity, water and gas 
P 
NC = Construction index 
PJ, = Weighted price index for 3 major trading partners 
P0 = Cameroon domestic price index 
PX = Price of exports 
P m = Price of imports 
CPIF = France Consumer price index 
CPIC = Cameroon consumer price index 
P N = Price of non-tradeable sector 
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E^1- ~ RER, ; E-P^ = RER) 
P P 1 N 1 NE 
P P 
E —— = RER, ; E — = RERA 
P P 1 NC 1 D 
CP IF 
5 0 ~ R E R 5 ; E Px IPN ~ RER6, ; EPm / PN = RER1 
Table 18: Average annual rate of (real exchange rate)— over-valuation* 
Period Average annual rate 
(Over-valuation) (%) 
1971-1975 -44.7 
1976-1982 -9.8 
1984-1985 33.6 
1986-1990 75.0 
1991-1992 77.1 
Source: Author's estimates 
Notes: *The calculation is based on 1983 as the equilibrium period using EPX/PN = RER 
Our estimates in Table 18 show that the real exchange rate was below the equilibrium by 
an average annual rate of 44.7% for the period 1971 - 1975 and 9.8% for the period 1976 
- 1982. The estimates show that the degree of Cameroon's export competitiveness 
decreased towards the equilibrium, which is estimated to be in 1983. The RER declines 
particularly after 1985 (Table 19 and Figure 3). 
The same period also shows a sharp decline of the nominal exchange rates (Table 2 
and Figure 4). For 1984-1985, the NER was 33.6%; for the period 1986-1990, it was 
75%. By 1991-1992, it had reached 77.3%. The very high level of over-valuation 
(especially for the period 1986-1992) demontrates the extent to which Cameroon's 
agricultural exports were badly hurt. 
Prior to 1984, commodity prices were high, contributing to increased production, 
and the government generated large reserves (Table 11) through its marketing board 
pricing policy (Table 8). This is also seen from the nominal protection coefficients (Table 
9) for the different export crops, which are by far less than one. Yet there was incentive 
to produce these crops partly because some inputs to producers were subsidized. It 
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F i g u r e 3: Real exchange rate 
Figure 4: CFA relative to naira and US dollars 
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Table 19: Real exchange rate (RER) 
PN Px Pm EPx/PN EPm/PN EP,/PD 
1971 34.81 67.32 66.86 532.99 529.99 427.18 
1972 32.24 66.14 70.43 517.96 551.55 383.77 
1973 39.64 75.5 71.40 424.52 401.47 329.88 
1974 42.21 107.68 94.72 614.04 540.13 336.98 
1975 53.79 116.07 109.19 462.45 435.03 295.75 
1976 58.76 131.23 131.38 533.65 534.26 320.19 
1977 60.94 185.55 126.18 746.31 494.76 307.10 
1978 72.76 122.83 139.58 380.94 432.89 266.128 
1979 85.44 138.29 142.98 344.50 355.97 255.26 
1980 87.79 109.24 174.61 262.90 420.22 255.65 
1981 144.07 125.13 182.39 300.27 434.48 238.79 
1982 135.50 141.28 326.25 342.37 791.21 377.90 
1983 144.77 143.92 248.66 378.82 654.52 396.30 
1984 181.41 115.11 337.46 277.26 812.84 428.22 
1985 • 207.99 106.28 372.12 229.56 803.78 449.26 
1986 201.99 77.22 349.59 132.39 599.35 325.52 
1987 228.82 67.17 112.24 88.22 147.42 273.49 
1988 247.72 60.86 236.62 73.18 284.50 256.15 
1989 217.57 67.3 279.89 98.68 410.39 283.92 
1990 240.64 66.26 281.11 74.97 318.04 250.48 
1991 227.93 88.69 213.23 110.69 266.13 261.72 
1992 240.10 75.5 261.11 86.65 299.69 
1993 250.20 78.9 271.5 
Source: Author's estimates 
should also be noted that this period was characterized by relatively low inflation rates. 
But beginning in the early 1980s the general price level started increasing, perhaps due 
to increased domestic spending on non-productive projects. As both the export prices 
and domestic prices are directly linked to the real exchange rate, these events greatly 
affected the real exchange rate. The impact of over-valuation is therefore seen among 
the three major sectors —exportable, importable and non-tradeable — and within the 
sectors. 
Furthermore, as in Table 21, we attempted to quantify the relationship between the 
relative prices and the real exchange rate, and trade policy. We examined the cocoa price 
relative to prices of non-tradeable goods, tx and tm, which are obtained by using the ratio 
of export tax and import tax revenues to total export and import revenues, respectively. 
The t-statistics in the parentheses are low. However, the results show that the real exchange 
rate has effects on the relative prices. For example, a 10% rise in the real exchange rate 
(i.e, 10% depreciation of the real exchange rate) stimulates about 1.9% increase in the 
price of cocoa to the price of non-tradeables. As we take the export taxes and then both 
export and import taxes into consideration, the percentage increase is .76% and .67% 
respectively. 
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Table 20: Exchange rate between Cameroon and Nigeria and US currencies (CFA/Naira, CFA/ 
US dollar) 
Year CFAN CFAD 
1971 417.6 275.60 
1972 382.6 252.48 
1973 337.7 222.89 
1974 388.2 240.70 
1975 340.2 214.31 
1976 379.4 238.95 
1977 378.0 245.68 
1978 347.2 225.66 
1979 379.8 212.72 
1980 391.3 211.28 
1981 424.5 271.73 
1982 490.4 329.61 
1983 508.1 381.06 
1984 539.5 436.96 
1985 449.3 449.26 
1986 104.3 346.30 
1987 72.6 300.54 
1988 55.7 297.85 
1989 41.7 319.01 
1990 30.3 272.26 
1991 20.5 284.48 
1992 15.5 275.58 
Source: International financial statistics Cameroon central statistics office 
Table 21: Relative prices 
Dependent variable = PCO/PN (relative price of cocoa to price of non-tradeables) 
Model 
Explanatory 1 2 3 
variables 
Constant .482 .541 .83 
(3.32) (3.115) (2.98) 
RER .092 0.078 .067 
(2.85) (2.67) (1.98) 
1-tx - .12 .112 
(1.61) (2.110) 
1+tm - - .07 
R2 
- - (2.91) 
.431 .391 .345 
DW 1.62 1.57 1.58 
t- statistics are in parentheses 
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Table 22: Incidence coefficient estimates 
Explanation 
Variables 1 2 3 
Constant .595 2.49 5.45 
(4.65) (1.954) (1.77) 
In Pm/PX .705 .546 .411 
(8.95) (3.595) (2.193) 
In Pc — .387 .419 
(2.651) (1.951) 
In TBR — _ -.598 
(-2.119) 
R2 .795 .805 .855 
DW 2.45 2.50 2.15 
F Statistics 2.45 2.50 28.67 
Sample period 1966-1993 
From Table 22, it is seen that the incidence parameter is as high as .705 and reduces as P 
and TBR are added to the regression. Pc represents per capita income and TBR is the 
ratio of trade balance to exports (exports - imports divided by exports). With successive 
adding of Pc and TBR, the R2 is increased while t-value in parentheses are reduced. This 
was also an attempt to correct for any simultaneity bias. 
The estimates of the first model indicate that a 10% increase in the price of 
imports (PJ relative to the price of exports (PJ would increase the price of the non-
tradeables (PJ relative to the price of exports by 7.1%. 
The negative coefficient of TBR may indicate the negative influence of the trade 
balance on domestic prices. However, the results of these estimated equations show that 
the exchange rate and trade policies are biased against exportables (particularly agricultural 
exportables) relative to imports. Consequently, there are greater incentives to produce 
non-tradeable goods and substantial disincentives to export production. 
Three agricultural export models were estimated with ordinary least squares 
method. The dependent variables were cocoa (QCJ, arabica coffee (QceJ and agricultural 
export (Qax)- The right hand variables include a weighted income of major Cameroon 
trading partner^ (YJ and other variables as specified. The results reported here arc all in 
natural logarithm (Table 23) so the coefficient can be interpreted as elasticities. 
Overall the variables are not statistically significant at the 5% level although 
they have the right signs. The prices of cocoa and coffee relative to the prices of non-
tradeables have negative coefficients. This is likely because any increase in the price of 
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Table 23: Estimates of agricultural exports response 
Explanatory Dependent 
variable variable Qco f^cea QAX 
Constant 1 0 . 1 3 5 5 . 8 4 . 6 1 
( 3 . 6 0 ) ( 2 . 5 ) ( 2 . 1 4 3 ) 
Qco-1 . 3 6 1 5 
( 1 . 4 7 ) 
Pcc/PN - . 2 9 8 
- ( 1 . 5 0 8 ) 
Pco/PNA . 5 6 7 
( 1 . 8 0 4 ) 
Y.P . 2 7 6 . 0 4 7 . 3 0 7 
( 1 . 4 9 ) ( 2 . 9 7 ) 2 . 0 9 ) 
Qcea-1 - . 2 7 6 
( 0 . 4 9 ) 
Pcea /PN - . 7 4 6 
( 1 . 4 6 7 ) 
Pcea/PNA . 6 9 4 
( 1 . 6 7 6 ) 
QAX-1 . 6 8 6 
( 2 . 8 6 ) 
PAX/PN - . 4 7 2 
- ( 1 . 9 4 0 ) 
PAX^PNA . 5 0 6 
( 2 . 1 1 0 ) 
DW . 8 4 . 6 9 . 9 8 
Adj. R2 . 2 9 . 1 9 . 4 8 
t -Statistics are in parentheses. Sample period 1966-1993 
non-traded goods relative to the prices of the agricultural prices reduces the value of the 
respective ratios. 
The response of cocoa and coffee to foreign income is fairly elastic for cocoa 
and fairly inelastic for coffee. The volume of coffee may not increase when the income 
of trading partners increases. A 10% increase in the income of trading countries would 
increase only coffee exports by .47%, while cocoa would increase by 2.76%. 
On the whole, an improvement in the income of Cameroon's trading partners 
(by 10%) would tend to increase agricultural exports (by 3.07%). 
VIII. Conclusion and policy implications 
The agricultural sector is heavily taxed through a high level of intervention, mainly 
taxation or government intervention and over-valuation. The levels of real over-valuation 
are quite high — up to 77%. Estimates show that a 10% depreciation of RER stimulates 
about 1.0% increase of cocoa relative to the price of tradeables. The producers of cocoa 
and coffee, the products with the most intervention, receive less than 50% of the FoB 
prices. The overall trade index shows a bias against exports, most of which are agricultural. 
This bias is clearly seen in the incidence coefficient estimates, which show an incidence 
parameter as high as .705. That is, a 10% increase in the price of imports relative to the 
price of exports tends to increase the price of non-tradeables relative to the prices of 
exports by 7.1%. The relation between the price of agricultural exports and the price of 
food also shows that food prices have increased relative to agricultural export prices. 
One would therefore expect a shift of resources towards the non-tradeable sector. These 
results are similar to others (Krueger, 1991; Wlebelt, 1992), although the degree of 
agricultural taxation in Cameroon tends to be much higher. 
The removal of these interventions is absolutely necessary for better performance 
of the agricultural sector and the economy as a whole. First, the removal of the negative 
price intervention would have a negative fiscal effect since the interventions are actually 
a source of revenue. A new revenue system could be instituted to replace the existing 
distortionary pricing system that is biased against small-scale agricultural producers. 
One example might be introducing a progressive tax schedule that allows producers to 
acquire reasonable profits as incentives to increase production and productivity. 
Second, because of the very high level of over-valuation, it is necessary to strongly 
consider the question of devaluation. This should include looking at factors that increase 
the price of non-tradeables and major agricultural constraints. In particular, the factors 
that have reduced agricultural exports and prices should be examined. Measures should 
be taken to improve agricultural performance partly by removing these agricultural 
constraints. The government must increase expenditure on rural and export infrastructure, 
lower trade taxes and maintain a realistic exchange rate, yet looking at the fiscal deficits. 
The real exchange rate policy should be complemented with other policy measures. 
Appendix 
Cameroon trade with Nigeria 
The exchange rate evolution between the Naira and CFA franc can be divided into many 
periods. The years 1961 to 1966 had a constant exchange rate. The naira was over-
valued relative to the CFA franc between 1967 and 1971, as well as between 1979 and 
1984. The naira was depreciated in 1972 and 1978 and again in 1985 and 1990. The 
naira witnessed a sharp depreciation as from 1987. 
The periods of over-valuation of the naira corresponds to the time when 
Cameroon's exports to Nigeria were almost double the amount of imports from Nigeria. 
For instance, in 1983/84 Cameroon exported goods that amounted to CFA9,314 million 
and imported only CFAF1,250 million. On the other hand, the periods of devaluation 
(or depreciation of the naira) correspond to the periods when Cameroon imported more 
than she exported to Nigeria. The 1987 to 1990 period was characterized by this 
phenomenon. 
Unit prices per ton of exports were generally higher than the unit prices of imports 
for the 1983/84 to 1991/92 period. This probably suggests that Cameroonian exports 
were sold at a higher price in the Nigerian markets than the Nigerian exports in the 
Cameroonian markets. This contributed to Cameroonian exports being less competitive 
in Nigerian markets and even inside Cameroon. The unit price per ton has been higher 
for exports than for imports since 1987, showing that the naira devaluation discourages 
exports to Nigeria but on the other hand encourages imports into Cameroon. In recent 
years there has been a massive importation of Nigerian goods into Cameroon. Such 
goods include electronic and radios, vehicles, household items, foodstuffs and medicines. 
Cameroon exports to Nigeria constitute mainly primary goods such as rice, fresh 
vegetables, etc. 
It is too early now to assess the impact of the January 1994 devaluation of the 
CFA francs by 50% relative to the French franc. Noting that, Nigeria immediately 
depreciated the naira relative to the CFA franc. 
Postscript: January 1994 Devaluation 
In January 1994, the CFA countries, which include Cameroon, devaluated the CFA franc 
by 50% relative to the French franc. The parity between the French and the CFA franc 
became 100 CFA franc to 1 French franc. Indirectly, the CFA franc became devaluated 
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relative to the other world currencies including the Nigerian currency, the naira. 
The 50% devaluation was across the board for all 30 countries belonging to the 
CFA franc zone. Within the franc zone there are different real exchange rates partly 
because the different countries have different fiscal and trade regimes. The cost and 
price structures also differ from country to country. Nominal devaluation across the 
board becomes highly problematic. However, different measures could be taken in the 
respective countries to reduce the negative effects of such devaluation. 
It is true the CFA was over-valued, but without any proper studies and appropriate 
measures taken it is feared that the present devaluation programme may lead to greater 
hardships. Casual observation has shown that there has been a rapid increase in prices of 
goods particularly in imported goods and those with imported components. These 
increases have also affected the prices of non-tradeable goods. In all, the general price 
level is increasing, which may lead to another devaluation. The major problem is that 
there were no detailed studies including a simulation excercise to evaluate the impact of 
such devaluation. Besides nominal devaluation, real devaluation would have involved a 
thorough examination of the cost and price structures, and the government's spending to 
avoid a failed devaluation programme, which may lead to further devaluation. 
However, appropriate fiscal and monetary measures including public discussion 
could still be taken to address the problem. There is need now more than before for much 
public discussion on the evaluation issue. I finished writing up this study in December 
1993, before the 12 January 1994 devaluation. 
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